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FROM THE DOCTOR TO THE SYSTEM:
THE NEW DEMANDS OF HEALTH LAW
Barry R. Furrowt
INTRODUCTION
HEALTH LAW HAS GROWN from the topic of an occasional
seminar to a new academic cottage industry, with courses proliferating
as new casebooks pour from the publishers' presses. Major law firms
now have health law sections, and boutique health law firms are also
common in many cities. What has fueled this growth? And what
does the future hold for this maturing specialty? I will take a brief
historical look at the forces that have changed the American health
care system, and the role of lawyers in it; and then venture some pre-
dictions-and hopes-about the future shape of health care law in the
United States.
What is health law? Health law is the legal domain that addresses
the health care industry in all of its component parts, including pro-
viders, insurers, patients, drug companies, and researchers. The field
of health law is a specialized response to the increased complexity of
relationships in the health care field and the intense fragmentation of
the American health care delivery system. Health care delivery is an
unruly domain, characterized by the lack of a comprehensive national
health policy and an untidy morass of state and federal regulatory
schemes. Lawyers represent various constituencies in this health care
system, from injured patients to physician groups trying to work out
agreements with large insurers; from drug manufacturers to pharma-
cies to universities conducting human subjects research. In a German
or Italian health care system, the concept of health law is not well
developed. In most European systems, because of the centrality of a
national health system with strong central management, there is less
play for private institutions, and lawyers simply have less to do. They
are social security specialists rather than health lawyers. Our system,
by contrast, has thousands of private insurers, hundreds of both non-
profit and for-profit hospitals, large managed care companies, and a
t Director, the Health Law Institute, Widener University School of Law;
A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School.
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large and powerful pharmaceutical industry. The cat-and-mouse
game between regulators trying to control the extreme tendencies of a
hyper-entrepreneurial system and the stakeholders trying to profit
from it requires lawyers, lots of lawyers, to handle the deals, the dis-
putes, and the regulatory battles. Health care is a classic lawyer's
playground, and it will continue to be one.
The heart of a private lawyer's work is protecting her client's in-
terests, as that client defines them. Transactional work involves inno-
vation in deal making, and mastery of a complex set of rules so that a
business can operate without fear of regulatory backlash. Health law
work is more intensely prophylactic than many areas of law practice,
given the pervasive regulation of many features of the health care
environment.
The government lawyer may represent entities with one of many
goals: promoting quality, access to health care, or cost control in pub-
licly financed programs, or all three. Typically outgunned by the pri-
vate bar, it is clear that in some areas, like fraud and abuse, govern-
ment health lawyers have gained considerable powers in their struggle
with health care entrepreneurs.
The academic health lawyer stands at a remove from the regula-
tors and the deal makers, and tries to understand the features of this
fragmented system and evaluate its performance by contrast to exist-
ing models. Our health system can do better, by any number of meas-
ures, and it is the job of the academic to probe, provide sharp criticism
and empirical information, and argue for paths to improvement and
the merits of alternative pathways. I have been an academic lawyer
for almost thirty years, teaching health law in several different forms
in a variety of settings, and the field is more complex and challenging
than it has ever been.
[Vol. 14:67
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I. THE EFFECT OF HEALTH CARE RELATIONSHIPS
ON HEALTH LAW PRACTICE: A BRIEF HISTORY'
(WITH ACRONYMS)
A. The Doctor - Patient Relationship
Physician + Availability + Cash + Treatment = PACT
The health care world in the late nineteenth century was domi-
nated by solo practitioners. The compact between doctor and patient
defined the health care universe. Doctors delivered care in their of-
fices or in a patient's home, on a cash basis. They also gave charity
care in hospitals. Patients avoided hospitals, which were known as
breeding grounds for infection.2 The cash basis of most of their rela-
tionships with patients constrained the ability of the health care sys-
tem to expand rapidly. We trusted our doctors, and the pact was a
simple one: we would pay in cash for the few minimal treatments that
were available and they would provide care even if cash was short at
times.
Pockets of prepaid care could be found in Kaiser's industrial co-
operative health care arrangements in California and the Puget Sound
Health Cooperative in the Northwest, which were precursors of to-
day's managed care. Physicians who worked in these plans or physi-
cians who practiced were either salaried employees of large plans, or
were paid on a per patient basis.
Hospitals existed as bastions of care for the poor until the 1870s
in the United States, subsidizing such care through their charitable
status and income, and protected through charitable immunity laws
against litigation for medical harms.
The physician-patient relationship provided the framework for
most health law issues. The historical evolution of the field of health
law starts with this central focus on the physician-patient relationship.
The courts nipped and tucked the edges of the provider-patient rela-
tionship, developing legal doctrines in malpractice cases, with in-
formed consent doctrine as an important development. Judicially de-
veloped general legal and ethical principles governed the dyadic rela-
tionship of a sole practitioner and patient.3 What were the doctor's
I 1 have based much of the historical discussion on the superb historical
examination of American medicine in PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
2 Id. at 75.
3 See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §§ 4-32 to 4-34.
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obligations to patients? Under what circumstances was a doctor re-
sponsible to patients for his errors? The ethical and legal discussions
assumed the simple doctor-patient relationship.
B. The Institutional Provider - Patient Relationship
Hospital + Open access to insurance + Patient + Expansion = HOPE
The hospital began to develop into a powerful scientific institution
around the turn of the last century. Hundreds of new hospitals sprang
into being; in the words of Rosemary Stevens, they became "a mani-
festation of modem America. ' 4  Stevens wrote that "[b]etween 1900
and 1917, patterns of influence, financial and political incentives, and
expectations about the hospital's function were created that we still
see today, both at the local and national levels."5 The professionaliza-
tion of nursing and the advent of antiseptic surgery speeded the reor-
ganization of the hospital into a bureaucratic entity.6 One could see
the ideological underpinnings of a classically American view of health
care regulation: "[t]he ideal role for the hospitals, from their own per-
spective, was governmental subsidy (or purchase of service) with little
or no government supervision."7
The laws of charitable immunity and vicarious liability protec-
tions were part of the indirect subsidies to hospitals, protecting them
from liability at the same time they were relieved of tax burdens.
Courts slowly began to whittle away some of the legal protections by
the 1950s, as courts became aware of the reality that hospitals were
big businesses with little need for such a range of legal protections.
8
The Depression had enhanced ordinary citizens' anxieties about
how to pay hospital bills, and it became clear that a working class
individual could not save enough to cover the high costs of extended
hospitalization. The American Hospital Association pushed for hospi-
(West, Hornbook Series, 2000) (explaining the legal duties of a health care provider
to maintain confidentiality and to disclose patient information); see also id at §§ 3-1
to 3-24 (discussing the law governing the regulation and licensure of physicians).
4 ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (1989).
' Id. at 19.
6 See id. at 18-19 ("Doctors and nurses combined to make the hospital a
'hygienic machine' in which the patient's body could be restored, recalibrated, and
repaired.").
7 Id. at 46.
8 See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957) (discussing the evolu-
tion of the charitable immunity doctrine and disavowing its applicability to the mod-
em hospital).
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tal services plans (Blue Cross plans) and through the 1930's, regional
Blue Cross plans were developed to offer hospitalization insurance in
prepayment plans open to everyone on a community-rated basis.
Such plans did more than relieve the anxieties of ordinary Americans;
they also created a new source of payment for hospitals and, therefore,
a new source of nutrient for growth.9
The Blue Cross plans blossomed during WWII, as the federal
government agreed that unions could bargain for health care benefits
without violating the wage freeze. The federal tax code fertilized
growth by granting tax breaks for such fringe benefits. Hospital
spending was unconstrained, since the plans typically paid ordinary
and reasonable charges without much scrutiny. Prior to World War
II, health care's share of the Gross Domestic Product was about 4%.
By 2001 it was 14.1%, and it is now estimated to reach 17.7 % by
2012.' °
World War II was a turning point for hospital capacity to treat.
The antibiotic revolution had produced penicillin, sulfonamides, and
other drugs. The Army and the Navy had made major advances in
surgery during the war, including use of blood products to prevent
shock in solders, mobile MASH units, and other technologies of or-
ganization that delivered care swiftly and effectively. These tools and
technologies were transferable to the domestic hospital setting, and
they enhanced the hospitals' abilities to treat patients successfully. I
With such capacity came the desire of patients to have access to these
treatments, and this required insurance to cover hospital costs.
The development of the Salk polio vaccine in 1953, and later the
Sabin vaccine in 1956, was a major public health development. I re-
member standing in line in elementary school in rural South Dakota to
drink a small cup of the Sabin polio vaccine. In the 1950s in South
Dakota we were well aware of the effects of polio, seeing parents of
our friends crippled by the disease and forced to use leg braces,
crutches and other aids to move around. The polio vaccine was a har-
binger of the increased power and pervasiveness of medicine. Doc-
tors were becoming an important feature of life; they gave comfort
and pain relief to the elderly with chronic diseases or terminal ill-
nesses. Annual checkups were still uncommon, however, and even
9 See STEVENS, supra note 4, at 171-99, for a description of the genesis of
Blue Cross and hospitalization insurance.10 Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012,
HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVE W3-54, W3-54 (Feb. 7, 2003), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.54v1 .pdf.
1 Cf ELI GINZBERG, THE MEDICAL TRIANGLE: PHYSICIANS, POLITICIANS,
AND THE PUBLIC 42 (1990) (discussing how these medical technologies brought about
funding for their domestic application and for more medical research).
2004)
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trips to the dentist were unlikely for children unless cavities devel-
oped. My only contact with a physician as a child was the result of
stepping into a pan of boiling water and getting third degree burns to
my foot. The skin grafts for several weeks were done in the doctor's
office, since hospitals were few and far between outside major urban
centers. And penicillin ensured that the foot was not infected. Medi-
cine was gaining clinical power.
The role of lawyers in this era grew as they represented the grow-
ing numbers of insurers offering both hospital and physician insur-
ance. And hospital law began to develop with the rapid growth of the
hospital industry-staff privilege disputes, contract and employment
issues, and other institutional legal work came to characterize the
work of the slowly developing health law practice. As medicine came
to be practiced in the hospital, the law of medical staff privileges, re-
strictions on practice, and antitrust law developed as a major source of
health law advising. As more money poured into the system, the legal
issues surrounding reimbursement rules and controversies grew as a
source of legal specialization.
C. The Insurer-Provider relationship
Commercial Insurance + Access Exclusions + Patients = CAP
Nongovernmental insurance proliferated in the 1950s and 1960s
through aggressive selling by commercial health insurance companies
who offered employers a better deal than Blue Cross by quoting a
premium rate based on the employer's individual experience, rather
than the Blues' community rating. As these insurers skimmed off the
healthier patients, the Blues were forced to gradually raise rates and
change their rating practices, setting the stage for the problems of
coverage for the elderly, chronically ill, and others at high risk.1
2
Employment-based health insurance became the norm, providing
even more revenue to fuel health care growth.13 It also foreshadowed
future problems with health care coverage, since insurance as a fringe
benefit of work meant that those who stopped working were in trou-
ble. Employment-based health insurance was an accident of wartime
collective bargaining, not a thoughtful design choice for a health care
2 See STARR, supra note 1, at 327 (observing the paradox of commercial
insurers' increased market share driving the system toward eventual government
intervention on behalf of high-risk groups).
13 See STARR, supra note 1, at 311 (noting that the expansion of employee
health plans after the war "took on new implications when in the late forties labor
unions gained the right to bargain collectively for health benefits").
(Vol. 14:67
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payment system. This is an example of the characteristic American
approach in which the path to health care policy is the end result of a
zigzag path among the landmines in the political landscape of the era.
The combination of Blue Cross and commercial insurance may have
increased the velocity of dollars moving through the health care sys-
tem, but the lack of federal money still meant that the health care sys-
tem was constrained prior to the passage of Medicare in 1965.
Drugs were becoming central as a treatment modality, and drug
product liability cases began to appear in the case law as large phar-
maceutical companies developed new mass-produced drugs that re-
placed the compounded prescriptions that pharmacies traditionally
had supplied.14 The power of the hospital to revive patients through
the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), new in its routine use
for the resuscitation of patients, raised interesting issues in the new
field of bioethics.1 5 Patients began to fear being kept alive against
their wishes, as a byproduct of the use of CPR. Fears about control
over death and dying began to be expressed by patients and ethicists,
and cases began to appear, including the landmark decisions Quinlan 16
and Brother Fox cases.' 7 Lawyers began to handle cases on behalf of
patients, not only for malpractice claims, but in termination of life
cases like that of Karen Ann Quinlan. And, of course, they repre-
sented the commercial insurers whose market share was growing.
14 See, e.g., Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 70 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. 1955)
(products liability action against a liniment manufacturer); see generally Annotation,
Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Drug or Medicine Sold, 79
A.L.R.2d 301, 369-77 (1961) (summarizing cases in which successful causes of ac-
tion were asserted against manufactures of drugs and medicines).
15 See generally STEFEN TIMMERMANS, SUDDEN DEATH AND THE MYTH OF
CPR (1999) (presenting a historical review of CPR in the hospital setting); cf Nor-
man L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of
Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 185 (2001) (raising the point that
similar to a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, a patient can
request that CPR not be performed in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest).
16 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding that a guardian could
assert, on behalf of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, the privacy right to with-
draw life-sustaining medical intervention).
17 In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67-68 (N.Y. 1981) (affirming the trial court's
decision to permit the removal of life support from a patient in a persistent vegetative
state who had previously expressed his wish to avoid medically prolonged life with
no hope of recovery).
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D. Government-Provider Relationships I: Pouring in Dollars
Medicare + Opened Spigot + Technology + Health Free = MOTH
Providers are drawn to health care dollars as moths are to light.
The federal government became the dominant payer for many classes
of patients, including the poor and the elderly, starting in 1966 with
the Medicare program. When I began the practice of law in 1972 in
Boston, the issues facing me as a young lawyer in a large firm with
several health clients were primarily related to reimbursement by pri-
vate and public payers. I handled coverage disputes between patients
and Blue Cross-Blue Shield and advised the Blues on insurance cov-
erage of novel or experimental new therapies. But the Blues generally
paid what physicians and hospitals asked, only fighting with subscrib-
ers over coverage issues.
A large percentage of the American population was Medicare and
Medicaid eligible in the mid 1960s as the two large federal programs
grew. Kennedy had made Medicare in 1960 a plank of his platform.1 8
By 1965, Johnson, having trounced Goldwater, had a mandate to get
Medicare passed, and Medicaid as well, in 1965 (effective in 1966). 19
Liberals thought that next would be universal coverage for women
and children, and then for all adult men. But no one else could or did
agree.
Between 1966 and 1983, when the prospective payment or diag-
nosis related group (DRG) system was put in place to control Medi-
care hospital costs, one could argue that the health care system was
free of financial restraints, the result of what Starr terms "the politics
of accommodation., 20 National health expenditures increased by a
factor of 10, from $26.9 billion in 1960 to $248 billion in 1980, in
constant dollars. 2' The increased quantity of money in the health care
system was a magnet for device and drug manufacturers and entrepre-
neurs of all sorts. Health care regulation began in earnest, defined as
18 See STARR, supra note 1, at 369.
19 See STARR, supra note 1, at 366-70 (discussing the Democrats' political
opportunity to create an "'unconditional war on poverty in America,"' which came to
include support for Medicare and Medicaid. Id. at 366 (quoting President Johnson's
Jan. 8, 1964 speech to both houses of Congress)).
20 STARR, supra note 1, at 374-78 (noting the importance of "buffers" be-
tween health care providers and federal bureaucracy and the favorable cost calcula-
tions for the hospital industry).
21 See Kenneth E. Thorpe and James R. Knickman, Financing for Health
Care, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 32,34 (Anthony R. Kovner
& Steven Jones eds., 1999).
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a set of strategies to control costs: in 1973, the HMO Act,22 in 1974,
the Health Planning and Resource Development Act 23 with its Certifi-
cate of Need requirements. Employers were also looking for solu-
tions---cost-shifting from themselves to the employees through de-
ductibles on coverage, dropping of dependents-a pattern that has
intensified in recent years.
By 1995, the federal share of health coverage was 45%24 Medi-
care was the spigot that few foresaw at the time of its passage. The
consequence of the opening of this federal spigot was a seesaw battle
between providers and their lawyers, and the government, its lawyers,
and accountants, to control costs by finding ways to limit reimburse-
ment. The cat-and-mouse game had begun.
E. Government - Provider II: Cost Panic
Physician + Insurance + Government + Patient + Escalating Use of
Technology + Naysaying on Spending = PIGPEN
The money still flowed into the system, but pressures mounted as
the players fought over the tightening resources, like pigs at the trough
in their pigpen. Blue Cross had become a fiscal intermediary, in ef-
fect managing the flow of federal dollars from the Medicare program.
The Blue Cross plans and hospitals proved adept at shifting hospital
costs onto Medicare through a range of apportionment techniques.25
The federal government was aware of the problem.
In 1973, I handled a Medicare reimbursement hearing for a large
Boston hospital under attack by the Government Accounting Office
for purported overcharges to the Medicare program for a range of
services. The amount of money at stake, around $300,000, seems like
small change compared to today's disputes, but it was the opening
shot in a long term battle over proper use of Medicare dollars. The
federal government had already begun to lose patience with hospitals
by the early 1970s. Medicare had only been in place since 1966, but
22 Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87
Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (2000)) (amending
the Public Health Service Act to promote the establishment of HMOs).
23 National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300q to 300t-14
(2000)) (promoting the development of both national and state planning for health
services and authorizing financial assistance toward that end).
24 Thorpe and Knickman, supra note 21, at 35.
25 See SYLVIA A. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 59-114 (1974)
(describing some of the techniques for cost-shifting to Medicare and the failure of
HEW, now HHS, to properly regulate this practice).
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as health care cost inflation heated up, the government had begun to
tighten its reimbursement policy and improve its auditing procedures
out of a rapidly growing unease about fraud and waste in the Medicare
program. Regulation by contract became the norm for federal-
provider relationships, and the proliferation of reimbursement rules
for Medicare gave rise to a new subspecialty of practice within health
law. Health law practice was still classified under the rubric of law
and medicine in the 1970s, and most lawyers thought of such a prac-
tice as mostly bringing or defending medical malpractice cases, han-
dling an occasional staff privilege dispute, or working on a bond issue
for hospital construction. But those who had hospital clients could
see that reimbursement disputes were going to become a larger and
larger percentage of the practice.
The mid-1970s saw renewed interest in health reform by three
administrations: Nixon, Ford and Carter. The rapid growth in health
care cost inflation was fed by forces set free in earlier stages: a federal
decision to fund biomedical research at a high level,26 rapid expansion
of the physician supply, 27 funding for construction and upgrading of
hospitals through the Hill-Burton Program,28 and restructuring of
health care financing. 29 Hospitalization costs grew, so private health
insurance grew to fit this need.
Health care presented a perverse economic market. For several
decades, payment was available for relatively unlimited care through
both private and public insurance. Hospitals did not compete based
on price; they had access to bond funding at subsidized rates for con-
struction and expansion. They competed for physicians who could fill
their beds. Physicians had a monopoly on the practice of medicine
and were not subject to any manpower policy requirements that seri-
ously confronted geographic shortages, so that low income urban and
rural residents were underserved or not served at all. This market had
become the health lawyer's playground, a nightmarishly complex and
fragmented system of overlapping nonprofit, for-profit, and govern-
ment sectors, without a counterpart in any other area of the American
economy.
Technology was becoming a cost driver in a big way. Investment
in medical research was reflected in a growth in the National Institute
of Health (NIH) budget from $81 million in 1955 to $400 million five
years later in 1960.30 Hospitals and physicians were avid users of the
26 STARR, supra note 1, at 338-347.
27 Id. at 421-422.
28 Id. at 348-49.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 347.
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newest technology, which was hawked by the makers, sought by doc-
tors and hospitals to maximize their prestige and cutting edge reputa-
tions, and paid for without sufficient reflection by private and public
payers-a formula for inflation and harm to patients.
F. Corporate - Provider Relationships
Systems + Knuckle under + Integration + Management + Patients =
SKIMP
Cost pressures continued to mount, and everyone in the system,
from employers to the federal government, looked for a way to skimp
on health care payments. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a period
of hyper-entrepreneurship, with for-profit hospitals beginning to ac-
quire non-profits, and for-profit managed care plans expanding rap-
idly.3 1 The hospital as the hub of healthcare began to fade. One of the
secondary consequences of the DRG program and its set prices for
diagnosis-related groups within the hospital was to move many proce-
dures out of the hospital to unregulated settings. The result by now is
that most medical encounters occur in non-hospital settings;32 and
outpatient surgery as a percent of total surgical procedures has gone
from 16.4% in 1980 to 54.9% by 1993, and the percent continues to
increase 33 Between 1985 and 1995 alone, 538 community hospitals
closed.34 During the same period, there was an absolute decline in
admissions from nearly 3345 million to 3094.5 million and a 16%
decline in inpatient days from 236.6 million to 199.9 million.35 Group
practices, ambulatory care centers, home health agencies, subacute
units, and hospices grew in part as a response to this shift in location
of patient care. The hospital had become less central to the delivery
of many surgical services. The delivery of health care became corpo-
ratized in the 1980s, the direct result of a desire by the government to
provide a method for cost control without using regulatory tools such
as price controls. Managed care was chosen as the market tool to
bring inflation under control, coming to dominate the market by the
31 See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS
OF MARKETS 134 (1997) (describing the "hyper-entrepreneurial environment of the
1990s").
32 Andrew P. Mezey, Ambulatory Care, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES 183, 186 (Anthony R. Kovner & Steven Jones eds., 1999).
13 Id. at 196.
34 Anthony R. Kovner, Hospitals, in HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES 157, 161 (Anthony R. Kovner & Steven Jones eds., 1999) (using American
Hospital Association statistics).
35 id.
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1980s and 1990s. 36 The 1973 HMO Act was passed to counter health
care cost inflation in the 1960s and early 1970s with the discipline of
private plans that would "manage" doctors and hospitals to keep costs
under control.37 Managed care began to develop, spurred by federal
policy and by a marketplace appetite for better cost controls from the
employers' perspective. The use of capitation by the modem man-
aged care organization, and its focus on cost-effective treatment, is a
modem update of the early history of health maintenance organiza-
tions.38 During this period the Medicare and Medicaid programs were
facing rapidly growing costs, while critics noted that American health
care was badly mal-distributed, limiting access by the poor and rural
resident, and was inefficiently administered and inferior in many of its
delivery components. 39 The country was perceived to face a national
"crisis" in health care in 1970, driven by escalating costs of "usual,
customary, and reasonable" reimbursement and fee-for-service medi-
cine. Under the Nixon administration, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) consulted with Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., a
Minnesota physician, founder of Interstudy, and an advocate of the
restructuring of financial incentives in the private medical sector.
Ellwood argued that the financing system should reward health main-
tenance through prepayment for comprehensive care. 40  This health
maintenance strategy was viewed as self-regulating, not needing a
new federal bureaucracy to manage it. The strategy appealed to a
Republican administration hostile to big government. President
Nixon adopted the HMO strategy as a cornerstone of his new national
health policy, as did then Governors Ronald Reagan and Nelson
36 For the origins of the managed care strategy, see STARR, supra note 1, at
394-98.
31 Id. at 396-97.
38 "[T]hroughout the 1800s, [various immigrant groups and their employers]
pioneered capitated health care and organized delivery of services." Emily Friedman,
Capitation, Integration, and Managed Care Lessons from Early Experiments, 275
JAMA 957, 957 (1996). Businesses such as railroads, sugar plantations, and lumber-
ing companies wanted to attract immigrant labor and retain it, often in isolated loca-
tions in an undeveloped United States. The provision of health services was an im-
portant way of attracting new labor and reducing labor turnover. Three of the major
organizing principles that underpin managed care were visible early: security to the
employee that all necessary care would be provided so long as the employment status
continued; financial risk-bearing by employers and/or providers, through salary as the
mode of payment instead of fee-for-service; and a focus on prevention or wellness in
many of the programs, as part of business goals of maintaining a healthy workforce,
and as a way of reducing the costs of chronic illnesses to the plan. See generally id.
39 STARR, supra note 1, at 381 (citing It's Time to Operate, FORTUNE, Jan.
1970, at 79).
40 Id. at 395.
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Rockefeller for their states.4' Congress passed the 1973 HMO Act,
which required employers to offer at least one qualifying HMO as an
alternative to conventional insurance in their health benefit plans, if a
42qualifying HMO was in the vicinity. By 1976, momentum toward
HMO growth increased as Congress amended the law to increase fed-
eral aid to HMOs. HMO enrollment began to increase more rapidly.43
Managed care, in all its myriad forms, became the insurance mecha-
nism of choice in many places.
Solo practice, once the norm in American medical practice, began
to disappear as managed care spread. By one prediction, the percent-
age of patient-care physicians in group practice will increase from
46% in 1996 to around 60% by 2005. 44 Physicians have lost work-
place autonomy as a result, even as they have gained a stable and pre-
dictable guarantee of patients to treat. Institutions that provide health
care, such as hospitals or nursing homes, and entities that pay for
health care, including insurers and self-insured employers, now over-
saw the work of the medical professionals who practice within them
or whose care they purchase. The emergence of managed care or-
ganizations that both pay for and provide care gave lay managers even
greater control over medical practice, in the name of both cost con-
tainment and quality of care.
Shifting loci of market power in health care created new tasks for
health lawyers. As physicians struggled to adopt new methods for
dealing with powerful systems, they needed lawyers to improve their
negotiations, draft their agreements, and help them sort out the com-
plexities of reimbursement. Likewise, as physicians went from con-
trol of the old hospital model, through the staff privileging system, to
a need to aggregate to gain power to deal with integrated systems and
economic credentialing modem hospitals used to improve their reve-
nues. In response, during the 1990s, Independent Practice Associa-
tions (IPAs), Physician Hospital Organizations (PHOs), Management
Service Organizations (MSO), and foundation, staff, and equity mod-
els developed, as transactional lawyers worked to create new corpo-
rate forms for the new health care economy.
The corporatization movement also took the form of a manage-
ment paradigm of continuous quality improvement and clinical re-
4l Id. at 396.
42 Id. at 400-01 (for businesses with more than twenty-five employees).
43 Id. at 415 (stating that enrollment increased 1.4 million over the year be-
fore and by mid-1979, total enrollment was 7.9 million people, which was double that
in 1970).
44 INST. FOR THE FUTURE, HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 2010, at 80 (2d ed.
2003).
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engineering, concepts borrowed from industry. The concept of con-
tinuous quality improvement (CQI) was touted to identify variation
from desired outcomes and correct it through protocols, pathways, and
clinical information systems.45 Outcomes measurement began to be
developed in a cost-sensitive, consumer-oriented health care market-
place. Purchasers began to look at risk-adjusted mortality and mor-
bidity rates, functional health status post-hospitalization for proce-
dures such as hip replacement surgery, and at community health status
measures such as immunization rate and levels of domestic violence.
Health maintenance organizations came to pay for more comprehen-
sive preventive care than traditional fee-for-service plans did, as HMO
managers understood that an HMO is responsible for the health of a
defined population, rather than for a series of individuals with indi-
vidual health problems. Unfortunately, the pressures of competition
in local markets drove managed care to compete primarily on price,
with a shift away from population health and prevention.
The United States has resisted centralized arrangements for health
care. 46 We have ended with this shift to more and more for-profit
health care, but without visible evidence of either strong cost control
or quality improvement. Instead, we have achieved a very high level
of administrative overhead, reflecting a competitive market for insur-
ers and providers with their inherent marketing and administrative
costs.
Lawyers work for these private companies doing regulatory and
transactional work, for hospitals now subject to a variety of both mar-
ket and regulatory constraints, for the vast drug industry, and for phy-
sicians as they struggle to maintain office practices and negotiate con-
tracts with managed care companies.
II. THE (PROBABLY?) PREDICTABLE FUTURE
ENVIRONMENT OF HEALTH CARE DELIVERY:
MORE
Forecasting is notoriously difficult, and our health care future is
complicated to predict, given the confluence of enormous amounts of
45 See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical
Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market? 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825 (1995) (explor-
ing the continued role of regulation of quality of care in an industry dominated by
management and the market).
46 E.g. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Is There Hope for the Uninsured?, HEALTH AFF.:
WEB EXCLUSIVE W3-376 (Aug. 27, 2003), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.376v1 .pdf (predicting that uni-
versal health insurance coverage in the U.S. is unlikely to occur).
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money in the system, intense political pressures, and high status pro-
fessionals.47
A. Managed Care Will Retreat and New Models Will Emerge
Managed care will continue to dominate the delivery of care, but
in a looser, less physician- and patient-constraining form, and without
many of the tools of effective cost management with which it began.
Employers will be more demanding about quality as well as price,
given that by 2007 over two-thirds of the American population will be
enrolled in HMOs and PPOs. 48 Health care costs will, however, con-
tinue to increase for employees. Per employee premium growth is
expected to be at around 11 %.49 Employers are struggling with
whether to absorb costs or shift them to employees. Managed care
may be less managed, but the form will continue to dominate.
The newest model to emerge, as yet unproven as to efficacy or
consumer acceptance, will be defined contribution health insurance.
Benefits managers in corporations are more willing to experiment
with these plans that use the Internet to market their products. They
appear to give employees greater choice in health care decisions, al-
though the choices are often complicated. These products suit the
ideology of the moment, allowing employers to shift costs and creat-
ing the appearance of control on the part of employees frustrated with
managed care. 50
47 See generally Theodore R. Marmor, Forecasting American Health Care:
How We Got Here and Where We Might Be Going, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
551 (1998) (reviewing conditional forecasting of the past and exploring alternative
scenarios for the future of American health care policy).
48 INST. FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 44, at 72.
49 Stephen Hefler et al, supra note 10, at W3-54-56.
50 See generally Jon B. Christianson et al., Defined-Contribution Health
Insurance Products: Development and Prospects, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at
49 (explaining defined-contribution health insurance products and their impact on the
health care market). These products have the following attributes:
(1) A portion of the employer's contribution toward employee health bene-
fits is placed in an account from which the employee purchases services
with tax-advantaged dollars. (2) A major medical . . . insurance policy is
purchased with a portion of the employer's contribution. (3) Employees
could, in any given year, need to spend their own dollars to cover an "actu-
arial gap" between the cost of services purchased using dollars in the
"health spending account" . . . and the services covered by the insurance
policy. (4) The Internet is used to facilitate and support employees' pur-
chasing decisions. Idat 51.
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B. Organizations Will Fight Back
Hospitals will continue to be the emergent winners in their battle
with managed care, having gained negotiating leverage and higher
reimbursement rates. In his discussion of the recent shift in power
away from managed care, Jacobson notes that "[u]nder pressure to
close unneeded beds and to streamline operations, the number of hos-
pitals has declined by nine percent (9%) since 1990, even as the popu-
lation has increased."'', The consolidation of hospitals into larger
chains, equivalent in size and power to large managed care plans, has
allowed them to receive a higher price for their services. 2 Short term
at least, hospitals will recapture some lost income. Over the longer
term, it appears that power will shift to newer models of delivery, as
intermediaries will become much more important. Disease manage-
ment companies, case managers, and health plans will take a more
active-and profitable role-in directing patient care.5 3  Physicians
on the other hand will continue to lose autonomy as the result of a
surplus, a change to employee status, and continued pressures on their
incomes.
5 4
C. Reimbursement Will Continue to Tighten
The use of maintenance drugs is increasingly important for treat-
ing chronic illness. Protease cocktails for AIDS, Lipitor and other
statins for lowering cholesterol, Fosamax for osteoporosis, and psy-
chotropic drugs for mental illnesses are all part of a rapidly growing
list. But the powerful products of pharmaceutical innovation are also
an escalating cost for state and federal budgets, as the battle in Con-
gress over prescription drug benefits in the Medicare program demon-
strates. The revenue losses of recession and the costs of war mean
continued reimbursement battles, as the budgetary pie is divided into
more pieces. Patients will end up with more of the costs imposed on
them through co-payments, deductibles, and large premium costs for
workplace insurance.
D. Errors in Medicine Will be Spotlighted
The Institute of Medicine, in its reports, has put medical error at
the forefront of the national debate on medicine, its costs as well as its
51 Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 365, 388 (2003).
52 id.
53 INST. FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 44, at 67-80.
14 Id. at 68.
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benefits." The patient safety movement is gathering momentum, and
the drug delivery system and its flaws is gaining attention. Pharma-
cists will become more important as a first line of defense in detecting
drug problems, since the doctor's office and ambulatory care setting
generally lacks a checks and balance system: no one checks dosage,
frequency, or duration. Reporting of medical errors and near misses,
the sentinel events of error detection, will be demanded of hospitals
and other institutions as the level of errors begins to be understood by
consumers. And the tort system may finally be altered in experiments
with enterprise liability, placing liability on the institutions that de-
liver care rather than just on the physicians at the front lines of that
care.
These predictions are based on the status quo and its most prob-
able evolution. I do not predict big changes in the mode of delivery of
health care or its financing, or significant improvements in funding for
improving access for the poor. But the future is subject to the forces
of health lawyers as well as other players in the health care system.
Below I suggest some roles for lawyers that may have an effect on the
evolution of the health care system.
III. THE FUTURE OF HEALTH LAW: PROTECT
I use the acronym PROTECT advisedly, for protection can be a
problem for the goals of the health care system. Whom are we protect-
ing, we health lawyers? And what are the primary and secondary
consequences of the kinds of protection that good lawyering provides?
I will offer here a range of positive protective functions that health
lawyers can serve.
A. Promoting Quality
Quality and its mirror image of error reduction have moved into
the limelight with the Institute of Medicine report, particularly To Err
55 See generally COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF
MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al.
eds., 2000) (discussing current research on medical errors and the implications for
American health care); COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED.,
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHIASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY(2001) (discussing methods for improving the quality of the current health care sys-
tem); COMM. ON RAPID ADVANCE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS: HEALTH CARE FINANCE
AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS, INST. OF MED., FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH
CARE: LEARNING FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds.,
2003) (describing demonstration projects that could aid in health system change or
redesign).
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is Human.56 This report brought to the attention of the public and
policymakers the high level of patient injury in our health care system,
and how chaotic and uncoordinated much health care is. As a result,
patient safety programs are being developed, and pressure from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Health care Organizations (JCAHO) and
states have spurred incident reporting requirements for hospitals. Pri-
vate industry, through organizations such as the LEAPFROG Group,
is attempting to force providers to provide more cost-effective "qual-
ity" care through the use of some fairly simple principles. 57 The Na-
tional Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) continues to ac-
credit managed care plans, and its requirements provide useful infor-
mation for consumers about the relative merits of various plans.58
CMS has also issued new rules and has demonstration projects un-
derway, as it moves to adopt the values of the patient safety move-
ment.
Malpractice suits will continue, as erosion of ERISA preemption
has opened the door to suits against managed care plans. Lawyers are
suing more, finding solid clinical practice guidelines to set the stan-
dard of care, and finding ways to make plans pay for their errors that
harm patients. The countercurrent here is the temptation by state leg-
islatures to provide varying degrees of protection for providers,
through immunity legislation, caps on the amount of possible recovery
in suits, and other strategies for limiting the efficacy of tort litigation.
But perhaps the time is finally coming for effective reform of the mal-
practice system to improve its workings, not as the AMA would like,
to make it go away.
B. Restraining Conflicts of Interest in Research
The scare stories of research gone bad-the deaths of Jesse Geis-
inger at the University of Pennsylvania and Ellen Roche at Johns
Hopkins-have sensitized us to the risks of research. Both govern-
ment scrutiny and tort liability now exist for research that is poorly
56 To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 61.
57 See The Leapfrog Group, Fact Sheet, at
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/FactSheets/LFFactSheet.pdf (Oct. 2003) (focusing on
comparing health care provider information, rewarding providers for protecting pa-
tients from preventable errors, utilizing accountability mechanisms, and creating
favorable purchasing environments for all clients as ways to improve patient safety).
58 See National Committee for Quality Assurance, NCQA Overview: Measur-
ing the Quality ofAmerica 's Health Care, at
http://www.ncqa.org/Communications/Publications/overviewncqa.pdf (June 2003).
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designed and /or exposes subjects to conflict of interest situations.59
New regulatory initiatives have been proposed for reducing conflicts
of interest, from the Association of American Medical Colleges, the
Association of American Universities, and the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS). New accreditation actions are also
being developed by the Association for Accreditation of Human Re-
search Protection Programs (AAHRPP) and the National Council for
Quality Assurance (NCQA). 60 The Office of Human Research Protec-
tions is moving from a compliance focus to a prevention focus. 6' The
FDA is hunting for conflicts of interest under its existing rules. 62 In
other words, more pervasive regulatory efforts are developing, requir-
ing lawyers to interpret them for institutional clients to insure compli-
ance with state and federal laws. This is a positive development, a
counterbalance to the corruptive power of money in a research envi-
ronment where hopes for biotechnology and other new scientific de-
velopments are primary.
C. Orchestrating Medical Information Protections
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act's
(HIPAA) medical privacy regulations are now fully in effect. 63 These
regulations have several goals. They aim to improve patient trust in
the health care system by removing the risks that private confidential
health care information will be leaked or circulated widely to those
64
outside the limited treatment team. The regulations aim to protect
proper treatment, while allowing providers full discretion in determin-
ing when sending patient records to other providers for treatment pur-
poses.65
59 See, e.g., Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky Law Offices,
Clinical Trials Litigation, at http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene (last visited Nov. 16,
2003) (listing some recent high profile clinical research litigation cases).
60 See www.aahrpp.org/index.html for information on the activities of
AAHRPP and www.ncqa.org/Programs/Accreditation/PHRP/phep.hrm for the
NCQA's initiative, the Partnership for Human Research Protection, Inc. Accreditation
Program.
61 See generally OFFICE OF HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, D.H.H.S.,
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, at
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/qip/qip.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2003).
6 See, e.g., F.D.A., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST WITH FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS, CONSULTANTS, AND EXPERTS,
at www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/conflictofinterest/guidance.html (July 14, 2003).
63 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-164.534 (2003).
64 See Preamble, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462.
65 See generally HHS, FACT SHEET: PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF PATIENTS'
HEALTH INFORMATION, at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/pvcfact2.htm (May 9,
2001).
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The administrative obligations of health care entities are substan-
tial under the medical privacy rules of HIPAA. Entities must establish
and implement policies, procedures and enforcement activities that
govern their use and disclosure of individually identifiable health in-
formation.66 The law requires a privacy compliance officer in each
institution to develop policies. 67 This officer is to receive complaints
and provide further information regarding patient privacy notice mate-
rials; provide training for all existing and future members of the pro-
vider's workforce; establish a complaint process for noncompliance;
and implement and enforce sanctions.68 HIPAA is a large mandate,
requiring a new generation of health law specialists to interpret and
apply the law in the hospital and office practice settings. Its goal is to
reform one aspect of the often chaotic operation of health care institu-
tions: record keeping. It is part of a larger effort to produce uniform
electronic medical records in order to better integrate the fragmented
American institutional delivery system, a goal which should produce
quality benefits for patients.
The computerized patient record has hardly followed inexorably
on the heels of the major new set of regulatory mandates that the
HIPAA regulations have brought. The United States lags other coun-
tries in this area, which is not surprising considering the lack of a na-
tional health service or single payor, which means the government
lacks muscle to drive providers rapidly toward a uniform system.
Once again, the drawbacks of an antiquated and fragmented system
are clear.69
D. Thrashing Bad Ideas
Health care policy is no different from any other subject of debate
in our country. The facts often are obscured by the carefully crafted
campaigns of vested interests of all kinds, and at times the facts, and
good ideas, are simply not being broadcast for lack of a broadcaster.
And these bad ideas can too easily become conventional wisdom with
enough repetition on talk radio and in newspaper editorials. This is
where the academic health lawyer has the largest role to play as ana-
lyst and surveyor of the academic literature in the field. Consider
some of our most dearly held beliefs. We believe we have a great
66 Id.
67 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2).
68 Id.
69 See Jeff Goldsmith et al., Federal Health Information Policy: A Case of
Arrested Development, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at 44 (discussing the prob-
lems of inaccessibility, fragmentation, and cost associated with the present, techno-
logically inadequate system for maintaining patient records).
(Vol. 14:67
FROM THE DOCTOR TO THE SYSTEM
health care system, and yet by the measures of the World Health Or-
ganization, many other countries score higher on multiple criteria
even though we spend almost twice as much as most of these coun-
tries.70 We think that we are a generous people, and yet as Paul Krug-
man writes, we are a Scrooge nation when it comes to foreign aid for
poorer countries for their health needs.7' We believe the rhetorical
railings of the American Medical Association about the evils of mal-
practice litigation, while the reality is far more complicated and the
problems more scattered.72 We believe that uninsured Americans
always manage to get care when they need it through hospital emer-
gency rooms and free care. This is not true most of the time, and even
when care is given, it is often too little too late.73
One of the tasks of the academic health lawyer is to promote ac-
curacy in debates over health care-to ensure that the facts are cor-
rect, the data meaningful, and the ideas meritorious. The power of the
various lobbies in health care demands strong countervailing power to
detect the errors in argument and help guide policymakers away from
legislating based on misinformation.
E. Energizing Public Health
The anthrax attacks of 2001 brought public health concerns back
into the limelight briefly, as the public was suddenly reminded about
this backwater of health practice. 74 Public health is a large area, en-
compassing assessment of community health status and needs; policy
development based on scientific knowledge and government leader-
ship; and access to health services. The federal government provides
leadership and accountability, while much public health is handled at
70 E.g. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000: HEALTH
SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE 200 (2000) (providing statistical information and
rankings for health care systems in different nations).
71 PAUL KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING 379 (2003); Microsoft founder
Bill Gates, to his credit, is single-handedly more generous than the U.S. government
in his AIDS grants in Africa.
72 See G.A.O., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS
ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 20, 26-27, 38-41 (2003) (questioning the results of a
recent AMA member survey), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf
(Aug. 8, 2003).
73 See, e.g., COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF MED.,
HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST: UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA (2003) (discussing the ulti-
mate costs to American society, including lack of workforce productivity and finan-
cial stress on families and institutions, stemming from the lack of health insurance).
74 See generally BARBARA HATCH ROSENBERG, FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS,
ANALYSIS OF THE ANTHRAX ATTACKS, (2002), at
http://www.fas.org/bwc/news/anthraxreport.htm (last modified May 12, 2003) (outlin-
ing the chronology of events relating to the anthrax attacks).
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the local and state levels. AIDS infections, ground water contamina-
tion, epidemics, bioterrorism, West Nile disease, gun violence-the
list of public health issues is a long one.75 Public health is, therefore,
a major aspect of health policy. Few lawyers specialize in public
health law, since there are few government jobs in this specialty. And
for good reason-the federal government's social vision has narrowed
over the past three decades, as the safety net has been privatized, and
we have spent less on infrastructure, education and research, dropping
spending from 24% at its peak in the 1980s to 14% of the budget in
1999.
76
F. Controlling Provider Avarice
One of the real growth areas in health law has been the area of
fraud and abuse. Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse costs fed-
eral and state governments tens of billions of dollars per year.77 The
billions of dollars paid by the federal government entitle it to en-
forcement by contract. As a result, health care providers are subject to
a large body of law governing their financial arrangements with each
other and with payors. These state and federal laws cover many prac-
tices that amount to fraud, bribery, or stealing. They also prohibit
many contractual relationships, investments, and marketing and re-
cruitment practices that are perfectly legal in other businesses. These
laws seek to rectify a number of serious flaws in the health care fi-
nancing system, save the government money, and prevent conflicts of
interest that taint the physician-patient relationship. HIPAA 78 ex-
panded federal enforcement powers substantially. The law expands
certain criminal sanctions, such as the anti-kickback law, to cover all
federal and state financed health care programs (except the federal
employee benefits program); creates new criminal health care offenses
that apply to abuses affecting private as well as public payment plans;
broadens the authority of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Justice
75 See generally LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE (Richard A. Goodman et
al. eds., 2003).
76 INST. FOR THE FuTURE, HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE: 2010: THE FORECAST,
THE CHALLENGE 169 (Charles Grosel et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
77 E.g. Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimat-
ing, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, andAbuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON
REG. 455, 488 (1994) (stating that a consensus has developed that fraud and abuse
contributes 10%, or $80 billion, to total health care spending, although "no one really
knows what the correct number is").
78 Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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(DOJ) to investigate all health care fraud, regardless of payment; es-
tablishes health care fraud, theft or embezzlement and other conduct
not limited to federal programs as federal offenses; increases the
OIG's administrative penalty authority by increasing fines, prescrib-
ing new minimum periods of exclusion, and authorizing exclusions of
investors, officers and directors of sanctioned entities; and provides
enhanced funding to finance and coordinate federal and state en-
forcement as well as establishing a trust fund into which criminal and
civil penalties are paid and used to finance future fraud and abuse
efforts.
The fraud and abuse laws have been used to bring to justice a
large number of providers, including some major corporate entities,
engaged in systematic fraud. The rules are extremely complicated,
generating confusion and the resulting need for legal interpretation.
These laws have had a profound impact on the health care industry
and have created an enormous amount of work for health care lawyers
designing organizational structures that must comply with their stric-
tures. The powerful regulatory reach of the fraud and abuse laws are
a direct response by the federal government to the size of the Ameri-
can system, its fragmentation, and the opportunities for avarice and
corner-cutting in health care institutions.
G. Turning the Tide
The United States lacks universal health insurance, and that goal
is sliding farther and farther away as the federal deficit grows. In-
come inequality in the country continues to increase, as does lack of
access to health coverage. 79 Is there a way to persuade the nation's
political leadership that it is, in Uwe Reinhardt's words, "a moral im-
perative to provide every American family with the physical and fiscal
protection that comes with health insurance, as it was in Taiwan,
whose political leadership introduced universal coverage in that coun-
try in 1995"?80 Reinhardt makes compelling arguments that universal
health insurance is not only a morally compelled policy, but also
makes good economic sense. Health lawyers, from transactional to
governmental to academic, may not agree on the shape or nature of
such universal coverage, but they could be united behind the merits of
such a concept. In an economic period when even professionals are
afraid to retire for fear of losing employment-based insurance, we are
all beginning to empathize with the plight of the poor in our society.
79 See generally COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF
MED., supra note 73.
80 Reinhardt, supra note 46, at W3-383.
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Health care needs to be a central part of the debate in local and
national elections again. The failure of Clinton's Health Security Act
has stalled political debate of universal coverage for too long.8' It is
time for health lawyers to energize this national discussion, with a
goal of making this country one to be proud of, instead of apologetic
for. Politicians are influenced by their more affluent constituents far
more than by the poor.82 What can be more effective than for health
lawyers to ask their congressmen to make health care access a central
concern of state and national lawmakers? Health lawyers have fiduci-
ary roles to play as professionals, and expanding health care coverage
is at the heart of what such a fiduciary duty can mean.
81 Cf Robert J. Blendon et al., Where Was Health Care in the 2002 Elec-
tion?, HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVE W2-426, W2-431 (Dec. 11, 2002), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.426v I .pdf (explaining the mod-
est role that health affairs played in the 2002 congressional elections).
82 See Reinhardt, supra note 46, at W3-388 (citing to a paper by Larry
Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political Representation, in which Bartels con-
cludes from a statistical analysis of senators' roll-call behavior that they "'appear to
be much more responsive to the opinions of affluent constituents than to the opinions
of constituents with modest incomes .... The preferences of constituents near the top
of the income distribution are even more influential, while those at the bottom fifth
receive little or no weight"').
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